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IN THE SUPREME COUR 1~
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL KANO and
TOMMY SEO,
Pla.intiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

I
r
I

ARCON CORPORATION and
\
BARCON CORPORATION,
(
Utah corporations,
and MAE L. BAGLEY, LEO L. \
CAPSON, GLEN L. PECK and
MANFORD A. SHAW,
Defendarnts and Appellan.ts.

Case
No. 8739

BRIEF O·F APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents brought suit to recover money damages
for crop loss, to restrain appellants from interfering with
respondents' water and water rights, and to require appellants to restore the flow of water from underground
wells and springs. The appellants are two separate corporations and four individuals.
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The trial court entered a money judgment against all
of the appellants in the amount of $8,217.36 and ordered
them to install an electric pumping system and to perpetually pump three cubic feet of water per second for
the plaintiffs during the irrigation season. From this
judgment all of the defendants have appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents are the owners of approximately twenty-five acres of land situated near 5600 South and 20th
East in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 146) The appellant
Arcon Corporation purchased a 56-acre tract of land
from Henry Moyle. (R. 354.) In total, the Moyle farm
had a water right approximately two and one-half times
greater than it needed. (R. 319-20) The land having
been purchased for subdivision purposes, the irrigation
water was taken off the land and the stock sold to Salt
Lake City Corporation. (R. 355) Considerable other land
on the east toward the foothills had also been subdivided
over the past years, and taken out of irrigation. (R.
298-99)
Appellant Arcon Corporation also purchased some
land from Salt Lake City Corporation. This land abutted
the east boundary of respondents' land, separating it
from the Moyle farm, and, prior to its acquisition by the
City, had been O\vned by a man named Ferguson. (R.
354-55). Ferguson utilized runoff water from upper irrigation and \Vaters naturally accumulating in a source
known as Spring Run Creek to develop some fish ponds.
Spring Run Creek was a surface stream and was covered,
2
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though generally, by a court decree. (R. 295-97) The
area embraced in the Ferguson and Moyle farms was
marshy and swampy, as shown on official topographical
maps. (Exhibits 3-D and 3-D [a]) Moyle had a large pond
on his place which was upstream both from Ferguson and
respondents. Historically, this pond had filled with water
from Spring Run Creek, but at the time appellant Arcon
Corporation purchased the Moyle farm, this pond had
gone dry. (R. 349)
There was not sufficient water from Spring Run
Creek for the fish ponds constructed by Ferguson and, to
augment this flow, he drilled approximately 25 wells, all
of which flowed under artesian pressure. (R. 279) The
combined waters flowing to the Spring Run channel from
the Moyle farm and the farms above it, from natural
sources, and from the 25 wells, were sufficient to maintain
these fish ponds. The fish ponds were operated until just
prior to the time they were filled in for subdivision purposes. (R. 358-60)
In about 1894 one of respondents' predecessors in
interest, a man named Boyce, learned that Ferguson was
contsructing a fish pond in the middle of his acreage
(R. 258). Boyce went to Ferguson and said "Why can't
I use some of that water?" Ferguson said it would be
all right, and a ditch was built jointly by Ferguson and
Boyce from what is referred to in the record as the middle
pond. (R. 257-59) This ditch took water from a pond by
gravity to respondents' land and was used for irrigation
purposes.
3
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In about 1904 Ferguson constructed a lower pond
near the westerly or downstream edge of his property. (R.
275) This pond was built entirely by Ferguson to serve
fish culture purposes, and respondents' predecessors did
not participate in any way in the construction of this
lower pond. (R. 275)
Sometime between 1912 and 1920, the exact date could
not be fixed by the witnesses, respondents' predecessor
abandoned the ditch from the middle pond and started
diverting water from the lower pond. (R. 275-76) The
lower pond raised the elevation of the water several feet,
so that water could be diverted from it by gravity to the
lands now owned by respondents. From about 1912 until
the times complained of here, respondents' land received
water from the lower pond by gravity flow. The acreage
irrigated during this time was substantially less than
that now irrigated by respondents, since the testimony
reveals that the quantity of water historically used was
very small. Bagley, who sold the land to respondents,
testified that he didn't irrigate his alfalfa at all. (R. 359)
The acreage that was irrigated by Bagley was no more
than four acres. (R. 341)
When respondents changed the use of the land to
row crops (subsequent to 1944), they began using considerably more water. There was no testimony fixing the
('xact amount of water used, but respondent Seo said
they never used more than between one and two cubic
fpd per second. (R. 155)
4
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During 1955, Salt Lake City bought the Ferguson
tract. (R. 355) It shut off the 25 flowing wells and drilled
a 20-inch replacement well to greater depth. The water
from the 20-inch well was taken into the City culinary system. Respondents brought suit against Salt Lake City
Corporation, claiming that it wrongfully shut off the 25
wells and wrongfully took from the plaintiffs the water
yielded by the wells. In that suit, the District Court of
Salt Lake County decided the issues in favor of Salt Lake
City and respondents did not appeaL In this suit they
complain against Salt Lake City for shutting off those
wells and for drilling and pumping the large 20-inch well.
At the trial these matters were considered to be res
judicata, and the suit was dismissed against Salt Lake
City. (R. 140)
The evidence at the instant trial showed that capping
the 25 wells and drilling the 20-inch well plus removing
the Moyle farm and other farm land on the east bench
from irrigation, served substantially to reduce the surface
flow at respondents' point of diversion. This was clearly
demonstrated by testimony that wells on the Moyle farm,
which formerly flowed, and the pond had gone dry. (R.
367-68) All of this occurred before the appellants installed the drains and covered the ponds which are the
acts here complained of.
In the spring of 1955 Arcon Corporation started to
subdivide the Ferguson lands and the westerly side of
the Moyle property. (R. 356) The 25 City wells had
been capped in April, and, prior to appellants' commence5
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ment of work, there was no surface stream whatsoever.
The lower pond was dry at this time and there was no
difficulty in working the area and filling the pond. (R.
359) In order to develop the land for subdivision purposes, a tile drain was installed running east and west
on the south side of the marshy area known as Spring
Run Creek. A tile drain, which also ran generally east
and west, was installed on the North side of Spring Run
Creek. These drains had the effect of further drawing the
water table down. (R. 314-15) They were necessary to the
use of the land for subdivision purposes. (R. 216) None of
the drains were located within the stream, but were located more than 100 feet away from the Spring Run
Creek channel to dry up the marshy area. The tile drain
discharged into Spring Run Creek channel at a point
within 8 feet of the base of the impounding dam for the
lower pond. (R. 220) The quantity of water placed in
the channel at this point is more than enough to meet the
water needs of respondents. (R. 166, 338) Respondent
Seo testified unequivocally that their complaint was not
concerned with the quantity of water. Their complaint is
that at the point of discharge into the channel the water
was approximately six to eight feet lower than the elevation of the easterly side of respondents' ground. (R.
220). In order to get their water on to the easterly side
of the land, it was necessary to pump, but there was
plenty of water. (R. 338)
The evidence was uncontradicted to the effect that
respondents built an impounding dam across the channel
inside their own field. (R. 445) The impounding dam was
6
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not so high as to cause the water to inundate the outlet
of the drain. This dirt-filled dam cost respondents from
$50 to $100.00. (R. 445, 452) They had a ditch from it
by which it would be possible to convey water by gravity
to all but five acres of their land. (R. 429-30) Thus, all
of their land but five acres can be irrigated by gravity
flow from Spring Run Creek by using an existing dam
located on respondents' own property. To irrigate the
other five acres, it will be necessary to pump. (R. 430)
The court ordered appellants to pump water for all the
lands.
The court also awarded respondents damages for loss
of expected profits from crops, including a celery crop
which was not planted due to unavailability of early
spring water. The court also awarded respondents the
full cost of a pump, aluminum pipe, a trailer to haul it on,
and depreciation on a tractor used to operate the pump,
and, in addition, ordered appellants to install and maintain a new pump.
The judgment of the court was entered against all of
the appellants, although there was no evidence to show
that Arcon Corporation or any of the individual defendants had anything to do with the activity that allegedly
interfered with respondents' water. All of the defendants have appealed.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT No. 1

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS COULD DRAIN THEIR LANDS TO MAKE
A REASONABLE USE THEREOF ONLY IF THE
SAME COULD BE DONE WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH THE RESPONDENTS' USE OF THE
WATER.
PoiNT No. 2

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE AN EASEMENT OR RIGHT
TO REQUIRE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE
PONDS ON APPELLANT ARGON CORPORATION'S LAND.
POINT Xo. 3

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
THREE CUBIC FEET OF WATER PER SECOND
FOR THE IRRIGATION OF TWENTY ACRES OF
LAND.
PoiNT Xo. 4

THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES.
PoiNT No. 5

THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST ALL OF THE APPELLANTS.
8
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ARGUMENT
POINT

No. 1

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS COULD DRAIN THEIR LANDS TO MAKE
A REASONABLE USE THEREOF ONLY IF THE
SAME COULD BE DONE WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH THE RESPONDENTS' USE OF THE
WATER.

Appellant had the right to make a reasonable use of
their land, even though it interfered with respondents'
historic manner of using the water. This point is of crucial public interest, for if a land owner has a vested right
to maintain the water table in adjacent land at or near
the surface level, then the adjoining land owners can be
effectively prevented from making reasonable use of
their land.
This is not a problem of water law. Appellants claim
no interest in the water, and respondents freely admit
that the quantity of water has not been diminished and
that there has always been more than ample water.
(R. 338) The drains which respondents installed return
the water to the channel within eight feet of the impounding dam which previously existed on the lower pond, or
at the point which historically would have been respondents' diversion point. (R. 22) Engineer Ward stated positively that the pond could not have been filled after the
installation of the drains as they presently are (R. 314),
even though he testified that the pond, through the years,
had become impervious and watertight (R. 300-01). An
9
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impervious pond can only be filled if water is introduced
above the impervious layer. (R. 325) The drains and the
taking of lands out of irrigation and the capping of 25
wells, however, have pulled the water table down to such a
point that water will not flow on the surface into the
pond. At the outset, therefore, we are confronted with
the question as to whether appellants bad a right to lower
the water table in their lands by installing drains which
would enable them to make a reasonable use of their lands.
The trial court totally failed to note a basic distinction between the case at bar and a water law suit. The
distinction is an essential one and is noted by all of the
cases. Where the parties are in competition for the water
and the right to use it, one set of rules applies. Where,
as in this case, there is no competition for the water, but,
rather, a claim by one landowner that he bas a right to
make reasonable use of his own land, an entirely different
set of rules applies. This distinction is universally
recognized.
(a) THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE RECOGNIZES THE DISTINCTION:
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law on Torts, Section 849, states:
"Interferences with one person's use of water
by another's use of water inYolve a conflict over
the same physical substance, and raise problems of
proprietary competition oYer that substance.
These interferences are dealt with in Sections 850864. Interferences with a person's use of water

10
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by another's use of land or other activity which
affects water only incidentally, do not directly
raise problems of proprietary competition over
the water itself, and therefore, in substance, involve the same questions as other types of interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Consequently, the rules stated in Sections 822-840,
governing invasions of interest in the use and enjoyment of land, are equally applicable to such interferences with a use of water."
The Restatement then notes examples demonstrating the difference, as follows:
'' 5. The A Mining Co. buys land and starts to
mine for coal therein. In the process of excavation,
the flow of subterranean water is interfered with,
and a spring on near-by land in the possession of
B dries up as a result. A's operations do not involve a use of subterranean water, and its liability to B is governed by the rules stated in Sections 822-840.
'' 6. A and B are severally in possession of
adjoining parcels of land. There is a well on B 's
land from which he obtains water for domestic and
other purposes. A digs a large well on his land and
starts to take a considerable quantity of water
therefrom. This substantially reduces the amount
of water that B can obtain from his well. A is using
subterranean water, and his liability to B is governed by the rules stated in Sections 858-863."

It must be concluded from Sec. 822 that where there
is no competition for the use of the water, but the landowner seeks merely to make reasonable use of his own
land, he is liable only on the following concepts:
(a) If the injury to the neighboring landowner is intentional, then there is liability only if
11
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the activity on one's own land is done with malice
or is unreasonable.
(b) If the injury is not intentional, then there
is liability only if the acts on one's own lands were
negligently done, or were reckless or ultrahazardous.
(b) CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND
LEGAL AUTHORITIES RECOGNIZE THE
DISTINCTION:
The subject under discussion is elaborately annotated
in 29 ALR 2d 1354 and, once again, the same distinction
is emphasized. The Article is entitled "Liability for Obstruction or Diversion of Subterranean Water in Use of
Land.'' The annotation deals with the intentional or unintentional diversion of water,
"as an incident of the use of the land or the cor~r
duct of some activity thereon, such as ditching,
excavating, mining, or the like, as distinguished
from an obstruction or diversion primarily for
the purpose of extracting or using the water. In
other words, the arwnotation is not concerned u:itlz
rights and liabilities in respect of a competitive
use of the 1-cater itself." (emphasis added)
The annotation is supplemental to the previous annotations in 55 ALR 1386, and 109 ALR 395, dealing with subterranean waters, springs and wells generally.
Recognizing the position of the Restatement, the annotator notes that:
''Under the rules adopted by the American
Law Institute, liability for the interference with
12
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waters of this type in the use of one's own property, to the injury of another, is determined by
the rules governing liability for non-trespassory
invasions of interest in the private use and enjoyment of land generally. Thus, such liability
depends upon whether the causative activity or
conduct, (1) if intentional, was unreasonable, or
(2) if unintentional, was negligent, reckless or
ultrahazardous.''
In explaining the history of this distinction, the annotation proceeds to note that the common law permitted
the landowner to make reasonable use of his own land.
Even though there was an injury to the neighbor as an
incident to that use, there was no liability in the absence of negligence or malice (page 1358). A number of
early cases are cited from jurisdiction following the early
English common law rule. It is noted at page 1361 that
several jurisdictions have repudiated the common law
rule, but at page 1364 it is noted:
"Under the rule or doctrine of correlative
rights, as applied in most jurisdictions, the owner
or occupant of the containing land is not precluded
from utilizing it for any lawful and proper purpose to which it is adapted, without liability for incidental interferences with the waters, and he is
required only to so exercise his proprietary rights
as not unreasonably or unnecessarily to obstruct
or divert such waters to the injury of neighboring
proprietors. To state the proposition more concisely, immunity depends upon whether the interference was reasonably necessary in connection
with the use or improvement of the land.'' ( emphasis added)
13
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The above quotation reflects the conclusion of the
annotator. The precise question in issue is further discussed at page 1368 where it is stated:
"The rules governing liability for the obstruction or diversion of percolating waters in
the use of one's own premises have been applied
or invoked most frequently where the effect of the
interference was to cut such waters off to drain
them away from an adjoining or neighboring tract,
so as to deprive the owner or occupant of the
benefit thereof. In the following cases, it was held
that the interference complained of was not actionable under the rule prevailing in the particular
jurisdiction.'' (emphasis added)
Cases from fifteen jurisdictions are then cited. On
page 1369 it is noted that aside from reasons previously
noted, the right to uninterrupted passage of percolating
water ''cannot be acquired by prescription.'' Cases which
did hold the landowner liable are noted on page 1371, but
only five states are there noted, to-wit: California, Indiana, Kansas, Pennsylvania and Washington. The \Yashington case, there cited, Patrick v. Smith, 75 Wash. 407,
134 P. 1076, was expressly overruled by Erans Y. City of
Seattle, noted below. On examination of the decisions
from the other four states, it would appear tha:t only California would uphold respondents' position. The Indiana
case cited permitted damages only where "negligence
or malice was shown." The I{ansas case cited permitted
recovery where defendant negligently left "unfilled a
core hole which it had bored in prospecting for gas and
oil, in conseqm'nce of which wells on adjoining premises
were drained and destroyed.'' The PennsylYania case
14
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also was based on negligence. Thus, in the absence of negligence or malice, all twenty of the jurisdictions cited,
with the lone exception of California, denied liability for
damages where the waters were interfered with by a landowner in making reasonable use of his own land. The
annotator concluded:
''To state the proposition more concisely, immunity depends upon whether the interference
was reasonable necessary in connection with the
use or improvement of the land.''
The ALR Blue Book, current to the year 1957, cites
three additional cases. In each of the three, the courts
held that there was no liability for interfering with water
in making reasonable use of one's land. They are McCormick Coal Company v. Shubert, 379 Pa. 309, 108 A. 2d
723; Trillingham v. Alaska Housing Authority, 109 Fed.
Supp. 924; United Fuel Gas Company v. Sawyer, (Ky.)
259 sw 2d 466.
The distinction under discussion is noted by Hutchins, "Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in
the West.'' To illustrate, he cites and discusses the Washington cases at pages 263-64. Of greatest significance is the
case of Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 457 P. 2d
984, wherein the City of Seattle was operating a gravel
pit. The water table in the city's land was so high as to
make it difficult to recover the sand and gravel, and so
the city dug a drain. The plaintiffs were located on lands
of lower elevation and they had developed water systems
for the irrigation of their lands. The court observed that
"These water systems have been fed and supplied with
15
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amply sufficient water from springs and small streams
which appear on the surface at points some distance from
and below the level of the city's gravel pit." After the
city drained its pit it was admitted that, almost immediately "all of the water, or practically all, was diverted
from springs and streams upon which respondents relied
for the water supply, and that as a direct and proximate
result of the opening of the ditch by the City, the respondents suffered a total loss of their theretofore sufficient
water supply.'' In concluding that the City had the right
to make a reasonable use of its own property, the court
stated:
"The fact is well established that the appellant city was making a reasonable use of its own
property, and that the draining of the gravel pit
was for the reasonable and proper purpose of extracting the gravel for use. Apparently, the gravel
pit property ·was valuable for no other purpose
than that of producing gravel, and the city, being
the owner, had \Ye think, under the reasonable use
and correlative rights doctrine, a legal right to
so drain the gravel pit as to make the product
thereof available for use 1cithout thereby incurring
any liability to others." (emphasis added)
Hutchins, after noting this case, at page 263, says:
"Of course, the City was making a reasonable
use of land which ma~y haYe been the onl~- practical use, and of which an incident was the removal
of water from the graYel pit, * * *. It should be
noted that no other limitations upon use are stated
in this most recent case, but it should also be borne
in m,ind that in this case the city was making a
drain,age usc, rather than a use of wafer on the
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overlying larnd for irrigation, domestic or manufacturing purposes.'' (emphasis added)
Another helpful case comes from Oklahoma. In Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Oklahoma 153, 64 P. 2d 694,
the court summarized the rule relating to the distinction
under discussion:

'' * * * the rule of reasonable use as applied
percolating waters does not prevent the proper
use by any land-owner of the percolating waters
subjacent to his soil in agriculture, manufacturing,
irrigation, or otherwise ; nor does it prevent any
reasonable development of his land by mining or
the like, although the underground water of neighboring proprietors may thus be interfered with
or diverted; * * * ''
See also Bristor v. Cheatha;m (Ariz.), 255 P. 2d 173.
(c) THE UTAH CASES FOLLOW THIS SA1IE
DOCTRINE
The Utah cases are in harmony with the general rule.
The primary and latest case in point is Peterson v. Cache
County Dra.inage, 77 Utah 256, 294 P. 289, where a drainage district constructed a drain near and running parallel with the east boundary of plaintiff's land. There was
no competition for the use of the water, but the drain
drew the water table down, rendering it impossible for
the plaintiff to secure sufficient water to irrigate his premises. The lower court granted judgment against the defendant. On appeal, the drainage district relied, to some
extent, on the English common law rule which holds that
water percolating through the soil without any definite
17
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channel is a part of the soil, and that in the absence of
malice the owner of the soil may intercept the water. The
plaintiff contended that the common law rule had been
modified in Utah and cited a great number of cases, including the Washington case of Patrick v. Smith, 75
Wash. 407, 134 P. 1076 (which has, as noted above, been
overruled).
The Utah Supreme Court, in reversing the trial
court's judgment for the plaintiff, noted that the modern
tendency is away from the doctrine that a proprietor has
an absolute right to use the percolating water in his land
without regard to the rights of adjoining landowners.
There was some argument as to the source of the water,
but the Supreme Court, for the purposes of its decision,
assumed that the water reaching the plaintiff's land has
its origin in natural sources, and then squarely held that
a neighboring landowner may drain his land without liability for lowering the water table in the lands of his
neighbor. The court said:
''Assuming, however, that the percolating
water which found its way into plaintiff's premises before the drainage canal was constructed
came from natural sources, stiU the defendant is
not liable, in the absence of 1nalice or negligence,
1nerely because the lfater table in plaintiff's land
was lowered because of the construction by the defendant of its drainage canal. X either the doctrine
of reasonable use, nor the doctrine of correlative
rights can aid the plaintiff in such a case. The
proprietors of the land U'ithin. the drainage district had a ri.qht to improre their lauds by draining thl' same. The plaintiff had no right to haYe the
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water table within his premises maintained at a
high level at the expense of rendering adjoining
land unfit for use. The plaintiff does not here
complain because he has an insufficient supply of
percolating water to supply his needs, but his complaint is founded upon the claims that the water
table in his land was so lowered bv the construction of the defendant's drainage ca~al that he can
not now irrigate his premises by the method of
subirrigation as he was wont to do before the
drainage canal was constructed.'' (emphasis
added)
The court went on to note that the doctrines of reasonable use and correlative rights have not been and
should not be :

''extended so as to prevent a;n adjoining la;ndowner from improving his land by draining the
same, even though such drainage may result in a
lowering of the water table in the adjoining lands,
nor should either of such doctrines be extended to
make a landowner liable for damages to an adjoining landowner, so long as the drainage is
effected without negligence and without malice."
(emphasis added)
In Roberts v. Gribble, 43 Utah 411, 134 P. 1014, the
court even applied this doctrine to a situation where the
parties were competing for the water. In that case plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent defendant from interfering with certain underflow, or subterranean waters,
which passed beneath the surface of and through the
defendant's lands. Plaintiffs also sought to quiet title to
the waters. In about 1905, because of irrigation of surrounding lands, a quantity of water began to seep and
19
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percolate, and at the time of the trial was percolating into
a natural channel. When not interfered with, these waters
which found their way into the channel flowed down the
natural channel to plaintiff's point of diversion as a surface stream. The waters historically had been diverted
from the channel and used by the plaintiffs to irrigate
their land.
In the month of J nne, 1910, the defendant constructed
a number of wells by driving perforated pipe into the
earth a short distance south and away from this natural
channel, and in a natural depression upon the land. These
pipes collected a quantity of water, and the defendant
used it. This dried up the channel and deprived plaintiffs
of all water. The Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant had the right to intercept the water before it
reached the river channel. The evidence clearly established that immediately after the defendant installed the
various pipes to intercept the water, the surface seeps in
the channel disappeared. The court said :

''The respondent undoubtedly had a right to
drain his land of the water and put it in a condition for raising crops. TYllether lze did this by
sinking wells or by digging drain ditches was of
no concern to appellan.ts." (emphasis added)
Thus, the Utah position is firmly established in harmony with the general rule that an owner of land has
<>very right to reasonably drain his land to make a beneficial use thereof.
The court is thus squarely confronted with the question whether an owner of land has a right to drain it,
20
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even though such drainage causes incidental damage to
his neighbor. Every state in the union that has passed
upon this subject, with the lone exception of California,
has said that an owner of land has such a right. The
Restatement of the Law of Torts is in complete accord.
The ALR Annotations are in complete accord. Hutchins,
an eminent water authority, recognizes the soundness of
the doctrine. And, of greatest importance, the only two
Utah cases on the subject clearly establish such a right.
The Gribble case held that the defendant "undoubtedly
had a right to drain his lands of the water and put it in a
condition for the raising of crops." The more recent
Petersen case squarely held that the water law doctrines
of reasonable use and correlative rights did not apply
because it was not really a water problem, and said that
the neighboring landowner had no right to have the water
table maintained at a high level "at the expense of rendering adjoining land unfit for use."
Under the very clear, convincing, and nearly unanimous authority, appellants cannot be held liable unless it
can be shown that they acted with malice and in an unreasonable manner or else were negligent. Respondents made
no effort to prove negligence nor to prove that the draining of appellants' land was unnecessary or unreasonable
or done with malice. The trial court made no findings on
any of these matters. The appellants acted with prudence
and reason, and were free from malice. Their drain intercepts percolating waters before they reach and become a
part of any surface stream, and it delivers such water to
the Spring Run channel at almost the exact point of the
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previous impounding and diverting dam. The sole affect
on the respondents (as in the Peterssn case, supra) is
that the water table in appellants' lands has been reduced
or drawn down, so that the waters will no longer flow on
the surface, and thus they will not run into or fill a storage pond, nor reach some five acres of plaintiffs' land by
gravity. It is not the sufficiency of the water with which
we are concerned. The flow is not diminished in quantity
or quality. Appellants are not using any part of it. There
is no evidence in the record to suggest that appellants
acted in any manner which could subject them to liability
to the respondents.
Despite the clarity and persuasiveness of the law on
this issue, it seems advisable at this point to insert a question of fact. It is possible, even probable, that appellants'
conduct was not the cause in fact of respondents' inability
to get water at a sufficient elevation for gravity flow irrigation on all of their land.
It must be stressed that there was no evidence at the
trial to prove that Spring Run Creek would have flowed
at all in 1955, even if appellants had not constructed their
drains. This is so because much irrigation on lands of
higher elevation has been discontinued (~Ioyle farm and
much of the east bench which had been subdivided for
residential purposes) (R. 354-55), the City had capped
twenty-five flowing wells in April of the same year (R.
;~;)6), and the City drilled a new twenty·-inch ''"ell to pipe
water into the City system. It is sheer speculation, therefore, to assume that the water table would haYe been at
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surface level to provide a flow in Spring Run Creek in any
event. In fact, in view of the diminished water supply, it
is extremely doubtful. One point is clear: Appellants'
drains intercepted these percolating waters, including
some waters at lower levels than Spring Run Creek, and
discharged them near plaintiffs' historical point of diversion. Coupled with this fact is engineer Ward's testimony that the drains also save water which otherwise
would have been lost by evaporation and transportation
seepage (R. 322-23). It is true that the drains now discharge the water at a lower elevation and thereby require
pumping operations to irrigate five acres of respondents' land which were previously irrigated by gravity
flow. But, if the drains hadn't discharged the water at
the lower elevation, it is distinctly possible that respond·ents would not have been able to irrigate any of their land
by gavity flow. They can now so irrigate fifteen acres.
No one has questioned that we had the right to stop
irrigating our land and the court has already held in a
previous case that the city had the right to cap the 25
wells and drill a new 20-inch well. Respondents have
failed to prove that respondents were negligent and cannot recover because of work done on our own land.
PoiNT No. 2
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE AN EASEMENT OR RIGHT
TO REQUIRE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE
PONDS ON APPELLANT ARGON CORPORATION'S LAND.
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If the court determines that appellants had a right
to drain their land, then no other question need be here
determined. The question of the extent of the respondents' vested rights to use the pond would clearly be moot,
because the testimony stands uncontroverted that the
pond would never have filled from the available waters
with the drains installed. (R. 314) The drains destroyed
the usefulness of the pond, and if appellants had the right
to construct the drains, there can be no liability, even
though the court were to conclude that respondents owned
vested rights in appellants' fish ponds.
Point I should dispose of the case. If, however, the
Court should disagree, then the Court must determine
what the respondents' vested rights were in the use of
the lower pond.
The evidence is not in controversy, so that the problem for decision is purely one of law. Ferguson testified that his father built the middle pond near the house,
with some help from Mr. Boyce. (R. 258) Mr. Boyce
asked, in effect, why he couldn't have some water out of
this pond, and Mr. Ferguson's father said, in effect, that
he saw no reason why :Mr. Boyce couldn't use the pond.
(R. 258-59) So prior to 1903 ~Ir. Boyce constructed a
ditch from the middle pond to irrigate part of the lands
now owned by respondents. (R. 259) Later on, and probably by the early 1900's, as l\Ir. Ferguson testified, his
father built the lower pond. (R. 275) l\Ir. Ferguson was
very clear in his testimony that l\Ir. Boyre did not help
in any way with the construction of the lower pond. (R.
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275) It was constructed by defendants' predecessor in
interest for his own use for fish culture. Later on, after
the pond was completed, defendants' predecessor in interest drilled approximately 25 wells to increase the flow
of the water, and right up until the time that appellants
acquired the land the wells flowed into the lower pond
and it was used for fish culture. (R. 359-60) The wells
were permitted to run to keep the ponds full. (R. 358)
Also, the Moyle farm to the east was irrigated with a
water right approximately two and one-half times greater
than the needs of the land. (R. 319-20)
Until the plaintiffs bought the land, the total contribution of respondents' predecessors to the lower pond was
a $6.00 contribution (six bags of cement) to repair a part
of the dam. (R. 342-43) Respondents bought the land several years ago, and once or twice they claim to have furnished a few flash boards for the headgate and repaired
some muskrat holes. (R. 223-25) There is no indication
that they were requested to furnish the headgates or to
fix the muskrat holes. There was no evidence that the
pond was used for overnight storage for irrigation, or
that the irrigators raised the pond, and then drained it
down in irrigation. The evidence was to the contrary. The
pond was a fish pond; its elevation was held constant by
appellants' predecessor, and he built the pond on his own
land for his own use and convenience. The ditch from the
middle pond may have been used both by Ferguson and
Boyce, but it was abandoned sometime between 1912 and
1920, and Mr. Boyce moved to the lower pond. (R. 266)
25
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He did not help build, nor did he help maintain the lower
pond. (R. 275)
The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the
pond was built and maintained by the landowner solely
for his own use. The cases are uniformly to the effect
that the use of incidental benefits from a pond by people
in the position of respondents is neither hostile nor
adverse, and does not permit the creation of prescriptive
rights to have the landowner continue to maintain his
land in that condition for his neighbors' benefit. In fact,
Bagley testified that during his period of use he
acquiesced in the assertion of a superior right by appellants' predecessor. In the 1934 drought there was not
sufficient water to keep the pond full, even with the wells
flowing into them, and Bagley was told not to use any
water. And so he went without water that entire year.
R. 340-41)
The principle applicable to this situation is stated in
"Farnham on Water Rights," page 2685, in a footnote,
in which it is stated:
''The fact that a ditch was dug upon one of
two adjacent lots for its occupant's convenience,
but which incidentally drained the surface water
of the other, does not prF\'"ent a subsequent owner
thereof from filling up such ditch and raising the
grade of his lot a boYe its natural level so as
to prevent the draining of such other lot as
before, • * * ''
Farnham, at Section
states:

8~7

(b), page 2429, further
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"A landowner has no riparian rights in an
artificial pond adjoining his land from which he
has been accustomed to water his cattle and to take
water for other farm purposes, where it is fed by
water flowing through an artificial water course
constructed for the purpose of diverting water
from a natural stream into the pond for the operation of the adjoining landowner's mill, although
such artificial water course and pond have existed
for more than a century, as such an artificial water
course is temporary in its nature, as it is limited
to the period during which the mill is used; and
the owner of the mill property may stop the flow
of the water or construct a fence along the boundary line so as to deprive the adjoining owner of
the use of the pond. No presumption arises that
a water course was constructed under an agreement with an adjoining owner under which he
acquired prescriptive rights in the use of the
water, from the mere fact of the existence of the
artificial water course, where all the works were
constructed on the land of the owner of the water
course, and no burdens were cast upon the adjoining owner." (emphasis added)
Farnham further states at page 2438:
''If the new channel is merely artificial and
made for the accommodation of the dominant
owner, mere acquiescence in the making of such
use of the flow of the water as the circumstances
will allow by the lower owner cannot be regarded
as an adverse user. There must, in addition, be
an assertion of the right to have the flow continued,
and notice to the upper owner that he will not
be permitted to change the flow."
The subject is annotated in 88 ALR 130. The
majority view is that where an owner constructs an arti-
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ficial condition for his own use and a lower user incidentally benefits therefrom, the lower user cannot acquire
a prescriptive right therein. The cases which follow this
view deny the existence of a prescriptive right on the
grounds that an adverse use is an essential element of the
acquisition of prescriptive rights, and the enjoyment of
incidental benefits of artificial improvements on another's
lands lacks sufficient adverse intent.
The annotation at page 136 collects a number of
cases involving dams. Every one of the cases there cited
involves a situation where the dam had existed for more
than the prescriptive period. An adjoining landowner
had received benefits from the dam. The owner of the
dam and reservoir in each of the cases for some reason
or another wanted to abandon the dam and let the water
return to its normal course or level. In each of the cases
the adjoining landowner urged the right to have the dam
maintained, and in every one of the cases noted the courts
held that no such right existed, and in each case the owner
of the dam was permitted to abandon it.
Representative of those cases are the following:
In Goodrich v. J.licJ1i1lan, 217 ~Iich. 630, 187 N. W.
368, 26 ALR 801, a predecessor in title of the defendant
built a mill dam. The dam raised the natural level of several small lakes, causing them to overflow on to certain
lower lands. After n period of 67 years, the dam became
decayed hy age and "·ent out of existence. The plaintiffs,
in the meantime, had built summer cottages and hotels on
the adjoining land "·ith reference to the artificialleYel of
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the lakes and had enjoyed the benefits of such artificial
level for a period of nearly 50 years. Plaintiffs alleged
that the return to the natural level had damaged them
seriously. They sought to require the defendant either
to rebuild and repair the dam himself, or to permit the
plaintiffs to enter upon defendant's premises to rebuild
the dam. They asserted that they had acquired a right
to have the waters maintained at the artificial level. The
court held that no such right existed, and said that the
defendant might either take out his dam or, after it went
out, refuse to rebuild it, and as to that "plaintiffs have
no legal concern.'' The court quoted from an annotation
in 50 ALR 841, as follows:
''In the absence of peculiar circumstances
sufficient to constitute an estoppel upon the owner
of the prescriptive right, or to give the adverse
party himself an adverse right, the better opinion
is that the mere acquisition of a prescriptive right
to an artificial condition of water will impose no
obligation to maintain such condition. The reason
for this is that adverse use is necessary to establish prescriptive rights.''
The .Michigan court later followed the same rule in
Pere Jl!Jarquiette R. Co. v. Siegle, 260 Mich. 89, 244 N. W.
239, and observed that the owner of a mill dam is notrequired to operate the dam for the benefit of a person who
acquires the right to harvest ice from the mill pond.
In Albert Lea v. Nielsen, 80 Minn. 101, N. W. 1104,
81 Am. St. Rep. 242, adjoining landowners had improved
their lands in reliance upon the permanency of an easement which had been acquired by a mill owner for the con29
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struction of a dam. The court held that, even though the
easement benefitted plaintiffs' lands, they cannot complain when the easement is abandoned.
In Vliet v. Sherwood, 35 Wis. 229, the defendant
constructed a reservoir to operate a mill. Water ran
through the defendant's mill and for a period of 20 years
or more the plaintiff's lower mill used the water. The
defendant, after a lapse of 20 years, had his mill destroyed
by fire. Plaintiff claimed that she had acquired a prescriptive right to have the water flow from the defendant's reservoir to her mill in the same manner as it had
flowed for more than 20 years. The court denied the plaintiff's claim to a prescriptive right, saying that the right
must have been exercised adverse against the defendant,
and that this element was lacking. The court observed that
the plaintiff doubtlessly had derived incidental benefit
from the reservoir, and that so long as defendant operated his mill, plaintiff would receive the benefit, but her
use of the water after defendant had discharged it from
his mill was not inconsistent with or adverse to the use
which the defendant made of it.
In the principal case annotated, Drainage District Y.
E1'erett, 171 Wash. 471, 18 P. 2d 53, quoting from the syllabus, the court said :
''Neither the maintenance for the prescriptive
period of a dam impounding the waters of a
stream, nor the maintenance for the prescriptive
period of drainage ditches by a. drainage district
organized hy lower proprietors sufficient only to
take care of the diminished flow, and their enjoy30
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ment for such period of the land thus reclaimed,
give the drainage district a right to have the condition so created continued for its benefit."
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that under the
better reasoned authorities where an owner, as in the case
at bar, constructs a fish pond for his own use, a lower
user obtains no prescriptive right to compel the owner of
the reservoir to maintain it. It is not controverted here
that Ferguson built and maintained the dam for his own
use. Nor is there evidence that respondents' predecessors
in any way contributed thereto. The dam was built for
fish culture. Water was placed in it from 25 wells, and
from the capturing of return flow from irrigation. The
fish culture use was non-consumptive, and the overflow
from the pond went down to the respondents' land. The
respondents' use of this overflow was in no way adverse
to the use and maintenance of the pond by appellants'
predecesesors. Mr. Boyce was given express permission
to use the water, but, when there was a water shortage in
1934, Mr. Bagley was expressly prohibited from using
any water and he willingly complied by using no water
during that year. ( R. 340-41)
Since there is no evidence of an adverse, open and
notorious use of the pond, and since appellants created the
pond in question solely for their own use and benefit, the
law is clear that respondents have no right to have the
ponds maintained so that they can continue to enjoy their
incidental benefits as adjoining landowners.
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PorNT No. 3
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT RE~
SPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
THREE CUBIC FEET OF WATER PER SECOND
FOR THE IRRIGATION OF TWENTY ACRES OF
LAND.

If the court holds that appellants are wrong on
both Points 1 and 2, and that they have a duty to
replace the water for the respondents, then in this
regard the trial court committed three three highly prejudicial errors. First, it has found, without any evidentiary
support, that respondents are the owners of the right to
receive 3 c. f. s. of water; second, it has ordered appellants
to pump all of the water perpetually, despite the fact that
all but five acres of the land can be irrigated by gravity
flow; and, third, it has decreed a water right which is
indefinite in its terms and which is unreasonable in its
quantity.
(a) The evidence does not sustain a finding that
respondents haYe appropriated three cubic
feet of water per second.

,_-

-_,·

-··-

There is really no dispute in the evidence. The
onl~T witnesR who fixed the irrigated acreage was
l\fr. Bagley, who testified that during the nearly
16 years when he owned the land it was naturally
wet. (R. 339). This is consistent with all the other evidence. The topographic map shows this area to be a
swamp. (I~Jxh. 3-D and 3-D-a) ~fr. \Yard indicated that
the ground water ·was high enough to reach the root zone.
(R. 339) When Bagley owned this land, many crops
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needed no surface water at all (R. 339), and during the
16-year period Mr. Bagley irrigated no more than four
acres of land ( R. 341). Even if there had been an appropriation of sufficient water to irrigate 20 acres of land
prior to 1903 (a matter on which there is no evidence),
the 16 years when Bagley was on the place, would
have ca;used a forfeiture of water not used. Under
Section 73-1-4, U.C.A. (1953), an owner of a water
right will lose it if he permits it to remain unused when
it is available for five continuous years. The evidence
without contradiction shows an appropriation of only
sufficient water for four acres. The land was wet enough
that no more water than this was needed. If in 1903 more
water than that were appropriated, it was in any event
forfeited by Bagley's 16 years of non-use.
A right initiated prior to 1903 cannot be enlarged
after 1903 without a new filing with the State Engineer,
vVellsville V. Lindsay Land and Livestock Co., 104 Ut.
448, 137 P. 2d 634 (1943). In the case at bar respondents
made no such filing. In recent years respondents changed
alfalfa fields into row crops. Alfalfa, as the court judicially knows, and as Mr. Ward testified (R. 332), has a
root zone that goes down many feet. It needed no artificial application of water on this land. Respondents
have changed the nature of their use to row crops, which,
according to Mr. Ward, take twice as much water (R.
332). This change was not made until 1944 and after
their predecessor had irrigated only four acres of
land less than three times per year. Mr. Bagley thus used
probably less than twelce acre-feet of water per year.
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Respondents started to divert and use, according to Mr.
Ward, approximately six acre-feet per acre on the full
20 acres of land, or approximately 120 acre-feet per year
(R. 331). There is no principle of law whereby they could
increase their consumptive use of water from 12 to 120
acre-feet per year, and likewise increasing their claimed
burden on appellants' land. This is an increase of 1,000 per
cent. And yet, without a filing with the State Engineer
and without a twenty-year prescriptive use as to the
claimed burden on appellants' land, respondents claim
that they had a vested right to so increase their consumptive use.

:.::

Aside from the extremely tenuous legal position in
which respondents find themselves, they are confronted
with an equally disconcerting question of fact. Simply
stated, it is that there is nowhere any evidence of an
appropriation of 3 c. f. s. of water. Indeed, respondents
never at any time claimed that they had appropriated
such an amount. To the contrary, respondent Seo testified as follows: (R. 155)
Q.

A.

Now, in the irrigation of your farm lands,
could you tell the court approximately what
size of flow you used for your operations?
We used to use between one and two secondfeet.

He went on to testify that this usage was only intermittent, depending on whether winds would occur to accelerate the drying of the land (R. 155).
The court was thus confronted with uncontroverted
testimony to the effect that (1) respondents did not have
34
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the legal right to increase their appropriations beyond
Bagley's right to irrigate four acres three times a year
and ( 2) even though there was an unlawful increase in
use, even that increase never exceeded a flow of two cubic
feet per second. Despite this, the court decreed a water
right of three cubic feet per second.
(b) It was error to order appellants to pump
water for more than five acres of respondents'
land.
This is a simple point, but a very important one.
The evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that after
the lower pond on appellants' land was destroyed, respondents put a dirt dam in the channel on their own land
and made a pond from which they pumped. (R. 445) They
constructed a ditch, which respondents admitted had been
used. Appellants caused a survey to be made and the
unequivocal testimony was that an actual survey of the
ground shows that all but five acres of respondents' lands
can now be irrigated by gravity flow (R. 429-430). To
place the burden upon appellants to pump in perpetuity
enough water for 20 acres, when as a matter of fact all
but five of the acres can be irrigated by gravity flow,
was error.
(c) It was error to decree a water right which is
indefinite in its terms and unreasonable in its
quantity.
If appellants must pump water for respondents they
are entitled to a more definite decree than that fixed by
the trial court. The court did not define the respondents'
water right at all, except for a finding that they are
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entitled to take water at the rate of three cubic feet
per second. There is no indication when the season
is to start, or when it is to end. There is no
finding as to the acreage irrigated. Nor is there any
indication as to how many acre-feet are to be applied
to the land per year. Even if the evidence would sustain the three c. f. s. finding, it is highly prejudicial to
order appellants to replace the water and not otherwise
define the right. As the decree now stands, appellants
would be required to pump water at the rate of three
c. f. s. almost at the whim of respondents. Appellants'
counsel objected and asked the trial court to fix the season of use and the duty of water, etc., but the objections
were overruled.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously said that
when it can not be determined from a decree how much
water has been awarded thereby, the decree is void for
uncertainty. A brief reference to some of the leading
Utah cases will be helpful. In Sharp v. Whitmore, 51
Utah 14, 168 P. 273, the decree gave no indication as to the
fall of the ditch, its \Telocity or the amount of land to be
irrigated by it. It was therefore held that the decree was
Yoi<l. In Francis Y. Roberts, 73 rtah 98, 272 Pac. 633, the
dcrrel' of the trial was indefinite in that it failed to fix
the irrigation season. The eYidence was conclusive to the
effect that in no season was irrigation necessary before
April 1st. The court held that the decree should, therefore have fixed this date as the earliest time in an~T season
for whieh the use of water in controversy by the defendants for irrigation should begin. Because of the failure to
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fix this, the case was reversed. In McNaughton v. Eaton,

121 Utah 394, 242 P. 2d 570, the trial court failed to fix
the details of MeN aughton's water right. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, directing the lower court to determine the duty of water. In Smith v. Phillips, 6 Utah
376, the court reversed a decree for uncertainty, where
the a~ard was for "one good irrigation stream" of water
from th~ creek in question 60 hours out of every sixteen
days. In Holman v. Pleasant Grove City, 8 Utah 78, the
court held that a decree which provided that in normal
times the plaintiff was entitled to sufficient water to irrigate 60 acres of land was improper, since the decree
should specify the amount of water necessary by an approved method of measurement. Similarly, in Nephi
Irrigation Companyv. Jenkins, 8 Utah 369, the trial court
found that the defendant was the prior appropriator and
decreed he was entitled to use water to the extent of his
prior appropriation, but did not determine the extent
thereof. The court held the decree was uncertain and
should be set aside on appeal. In Lost Creek Irrigation
Company, v. Rex, 26 Utah 485, 73 P. 660, the court awarded the plaintiff and defendant each one-half of the normal
flow of the water in a creek after June 15th of each year.
Held, the decree is too uncertain in that it fixes no time
when the normal flow of water ceased and the high water
began. In Hardy v. Beaver County Irrigation Company,
65 Utah, 28, 234 Pac. 524, the court stated that the main
purpose of an action to quiet title is to determine the respective rights of the parties to the use of the water, and
the decree should definitely award the respective rights
to the parties to the action. The decree must be sufficiently
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definite and certain as to the parties, the order of their
respective priorities, the quantity of water which each is
entitled to use, the times when they are entitled to use
the water, and any other matter which the evidence of
each particular case may develop. The failure of the
decree to contain such elements with reasonable certainty
is error.
In the case at bar, the decree does not even define
the land to be irrigated. It decrees that respondents are
the owners and entitled to the use of approximately three
cubic feet per second of water from Spring Run Creek for
the purpose of irrigating lands which respondents own
in portions of Sections 8, 9, 16 and 17 of T. 2 S., R. 1 E.
The acreage is not given. The particular land to be irrigated is not described. No element of the appropriation
is fixed, except that respondents are entitled to '' approximately" 3 c. f. s. (R. 123) Reference to the findings
doesn't clarify. Finding No. 1 only provides that the respondents are the owners of "approximately" 25 acres
of land. (R. 114) The evidence is uncontradicted that
there is a substantial portion of this land located north of
Spring Run Creek which is not irrigated, so there isn't
even a finding as to the acreage irrigated, or for which
appellants must for all time to come pump 3 c. f. s. of
water. (R. 123)
It is submitted that where appellants have been ordered to pump in perpetuity the water for the lands of
the respondents, there must be a more definite decree
fixing the beginning and the end of the irrigation season,
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the rate of flow, the duty of the land, and the total quantity of water in acre-feet respondents are entitled to receive. Otherwise, appellants are at respondents' mercy
to pay for pumping upon demand with no limitation as
to beneficial needs.
Finally, an observation must be made as to the reasonableness of the amount of water awarded. Certainly
respondents must limit themselves to the quantity of
water they can beneficially use. It is inconceivable that
they could use on their approximately nineteen acres of
ground a continuous flow of three cubic feet per second.
This would amount to six acre-feet per day. They are
claiming an unusually long irrigation season, totaling
more than 220 days. A continuous flow would yield 1320
acre-feet of water, and on their acreage this would amount
to more than 60 acre-feet of water per acre of land per
year. In this state, where the Supreme Court has again
and again affirmed as adequate a duty of water between
three and four acre-feet per acre, this is fantastically
high. There is no evidence to sustain such use.
The conclusion is inescapable. The trial court's decree of a water right of three c.f.s. is indefinite and excessive. It is, therefore, void.
PorNT No. 4

THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES.

(a) The court erred in awarding damages for loss
of crops not planted.
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One of the hornbook rules of damages, which is so
clear that Professor McCormick states it unequivocally,
is simply: "If the invasion merely prevents the plaintiff
from planting his land, the measure is not the value of the
hoped for crop, but the rental value of the land for the
season." McCormick, Damages § 126 (1935).
The cases all sustain this rule of damages. The headnote to Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, 217 P. 2d 816
(Okla.) is a fair representation of existing case law:
''The measure of damage for anticipated loss
of crops which could not be planted by reason of
damage caused is the reasonable rental value of
the land for the season.''
An annotation in 108 ALR 1174 reaffirms the rule. It
is entitled ''Measure and Amount of Damage for Breach
of Duty to Furnish Water, Gas, Lights or Power." The
annotator states the rule on page 1185 as follows:
''The raising of a crop not yet planted being
too uncertain, and damages based upon the assumption of loss of profits from such a crop being
altogether too speculative, it has been held in a
number of such cases that the true measure of
damages for failure to furnish water for irrigation
was the difference between the rental value of
the land with the water and its rental value
without it.''
In support of this rule, the annotation cites many
cases.
The law in Utah is well settled and supports this
rule. In ~1damson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d
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264, the court held that expected profits lost by a landowner on future crops of wheat which he failed to plant
(because of lack of irrigation water) were not proper elements of damage for permanent destruction of his easement in an irrigation ditch which was destroyed by owners of adjacent land. If the crops were already planted
or in existence, a different rule of computing damages
would apply. But where the crops have not yet been
planted, the complainant can only hope to recover the cost
of preparing and cultivating the ground and the actual
expense of purchasing seed which is lost by the inability
to plant. (Adamson case at page 82) In the cases of Naylor v. Floor, 51 Utah 382, 170 Pac. 971 (1918); Sharp v.
Cankis Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 Pac. 337 (1924) and
Petrofesa v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.,
110 Utah 109, 169 P. 2d 808 (1946) the issue was the
measure of damage to crops which were growing. It is
admitted that in such a situation the profit reasonably to
be expected, less cost of growing and harvesting, is the
measure of recovery. In the Petrofesa case the plaintiff
had been delayed in planting his celery crop because the
defendant railroad had covered his irrigation ditch. The
issue there before the court was the measure of damage to
a crop which had been planted late in the season, such
delay causing a loss when the celery was marketed. It
was therefore appropriate for the court to apply the
measure of damages applicable to growing crops.
The above cases are cited to emphasize the distinction between crops not yet planted and crops which are
already planted. In the case at bar the respondents had
41
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celery plants in a greenhouse and they claim that they
were prevented from setting out the plants because of
appellants' interference with the water. Consequently,
respondents failed to plant celery in two and one-half
acres of land which had been prepared for planting. They
contend that, had they planted the land, they would have
grossed $5,000.00. Estimated harvesting and growing
expenses are then deducted by the respondents and a net
loss of $2,800.00 is assessed. (R. 174)
It is submitted that it was manifestly erroneous to
measure damages as if these were growing crops. The
celery crop was never planted. Squash was planted and
a lower gross was realized. To allow damages for expected profits of a celery crop which was never planted is
absurd. There is no case which allows expected profits
for a crop which was never set in the ground. It is even
more ridiculous to allow expected profits for one type of
crop (celery) when a different type of crop (squash) was
actually grown on the land in question. All that respondents can hope to recover is the cost of growing the celery
plants which were never planted. The cost of cultivating
the land is not a logical item of damage since squash
was planted and the cultivation was not a loss. Respondents might argue that the celery plants were growing
crops since they were ''in existence.'' This is without
merit. The Adamson case, supra, mentions damage to
crops which are ''in existence'' as an item of special
damage. Every reasonable indication suggests that crops
have three stages: (1) Before they are planted; (2) after
they are planted, but before they come into existence;
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and (3) after they come into existence (i. e., after they
are growing). This interpretation is sustained by the fact
that in the Adamson case there had been an expenditure
for wheat which was not planted. The court was willing
to allow the actual cost of the wheat as an expense, but
never entertained the thought of allowing damages for
expected profit on a crop of wheat that was never planted.
The rule allowing only the rental value of the land
is a practical rule. Where the crop is planted, there is
no way to salvage the seed and rent other lands. Where,
however, the seed has not been planted, the operator
may find other lands and run his risks of profit or loss.
Thus, his damages are limited by the courts to the rental
value of land.
(b) The court erred in awarding damages which
respondents failed to mitigate.
It is elemental in the law of damages that, absent
some malicious act on the part of defendant, plaintiff is
under an obligation to mitigate his damage. If he fails to
do this, he can recover only the amount which his damages
would have been if there had been a proper mitigation.
Respondents, if they had so elected, could have
adopted either of two convenient methods of mitigating
their damages. First, for a price of only $25.00 per week,
they could have rented a pump which would have pumped
adequate water for their lands. (R. 413-14) Secondly,
they could have put in a dam for a cost of only $75.00
which would have been so situate! that it would have
provided gravity flow irrigation for fifteen acres. (R. 42943
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30, 445, 452) Both of these solutions were reasonable,
inexpensive and convenient. Either one would have provided water for ample acreage to plant the celery crop
as early in May as they desired. Since respondent Seo
testified that he knew as early as May 4 that water would
not be delivered to them, and since he testified that he
knew substantial damage would result (R. 204-06), there
is no justification for failing to mitigate when either of
the methods above would, at nominal cost, have prevented a claimed loss of a crop expected to gross
$5,000.00.
It is submitted that, under earlier arguments, appellants are not liable to respondents for any damages. If,
however, damages are assessed for loss of crops, the
amount can only be $25.00 per week for three weeks as
the rental value of a pump plus an additional $25.00 to
$30.00 for gasoline to run the pump, or, in the alternative,
the damage figure could be $75.00, which was the cost of
building the impounding dam which provided water for
fifteen acres by gravity. (R. 445, 452)
(c) The court erred in awarding duplicate damages.

-·
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In referring to Finding No. 11, it appears that the
court awarded general damages as follows:
Cost of a pump ----------------------------------$ 827.00
Cost of dam for catch-basin ___________ _ 75.00
Digging of dam for catch-basin _____ _ 75.00
Cost of pipe-11lengths @ $25.45 370.95
Hauling of pipe to land ___________________ _ 100.00
Total .................................................................................. $1,411.75
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There is no testimony whatever to indicate that
the pump which was purchased is worn out or that the
pipe is worn out. Yet, the court ordered appellants to
install a suitable and efficient electrical pumping system
for respondents. If appellants fail so to do, respondents
are awarded judgment for an additional $1,500.00. It
is respectfully submitted that this is error. This requires
appellants to buy two pumps. First, they must pay the
full purchase price of the pump that respondents
bought; and, second, they are required to pay for and
install an additional pump. Certainly there should be a
credit for the remaining value of the original pump if
appellants are required to install a new one.
Appellants are also ordered by the decree to place
the water to be pumped in perpetuity "at a point in the
Northeast corner of plaintiffs' lands where the large
drain enters plaintiffs' properties as a substitute system in lieu of the ditches and facilities which defendants
previously destroyed." (R. 123) Again, no credit is
allowed for the aluminum pipe which obviously still remains. The court simply granted respondents' prayer.
In fact, reference to the memorandum indicates that the
court granted respondents more than they wanted, and
several matters were voluntarily eliminated when the
findings and conclusions were presented. It appears that
the trial judge did not go beyond a consideration of the
question of liability. Having once determined the issues
of law against appellants, the trial judge simply granted
everything that had been mentioned in the evidence and,
as to some items, doubled the damages. He ordered
45
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appellants in the memorandum decision to pay the future
cost of pumping, but still awarded respondents $1,600.00
for estimated future pump operations. He ordered appellants to install the pump, but gave respondents a
$1,500.00 judgment for the same. In the top item on page
4 of the memorandum decision, he gave respondents
tractor rental of $946.00, labor costs of $410.00, etc., and
then under special damages gave judgment again for the
same items. (R. 106) His total judgment as awarded by
the memorandum decision was $13,344.00. This was voluntarily cut down by respondents to $8,217.00, thus eliminating nearly $5,000.00 of duplicate awards.
We respectfully submit that respondents, under anybody's theory of the case, still have been permitted to
recover the duplicate cost of the pump and the pipe.
(d) The court erred in awarding other items of
damage not sustained by the evidence.
This final subsection is intended to be a brief commentary on the nature of respondents' testimony and its
adequacy in sustaining the damages awarded. Respondent Seo testified that his tractor ·which he had used for
pumping had depreciated $1,000.00 while being used for
that purpose and that its present value was only $500.00.
Upon cross-examination, however, he admitted that he
would not sell his tractor for that price. (R. 203) This
was a clear confession that the depreciation really hadn't
been as great as he testified on direct examination. Yet,
the court awarded the full amount claimed in his initial
testimony.
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There are many things in respondents' testimony
which simply do not ring true. Respondents were only
without water until May 23rd, which is the date they
started pumping. They allege that, because they were
without water for ten days, enormous damage resulted.
This seems incredible in light of the fact that, in respondents' suit against Salt Lake City because it capped its
wells, respondent Seo testified that they depended for
early water on the wells and that the surface flow did not
normally start until after the middle of May. His specific testimony is as follows :

"Q. And about how early in the spring would it
be before the spring water came in with the
well water as a general rule 1
''A. It would be after May.
'' Q. Is that after May 1 or" A. Well, I believe it would be after the middle of May."
Mr. Seo then testified in this trial that he knew by May
4th, when the ponds were destroyed, that appellants were
not going to furnish him with water. He testified that he
foresaw the impending damage, yet made no immediate effort to rent a pump or construct the impounding
dam. (R. 204-06)
In light of respondent Seo 's testimony that they relied on the water from the City wells for their early May
water because water is not normally available from
Spring Run Creek until after the middle of May, it should
be noted that Mr. Ward testified that the drains would
reach additional water which was not available at the sur-
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face of Spring Run Creek. (R.322-23) Spring Run Creek
flows only when the ground water tables are brought up
to ground level. Thus, the effect of this testimony is that,
if anything, the drains have made Spring Run Creek
water available earlier in the year.
Also worthy of note is the fact that the demand letter (which is in evidence) written by respondents' attorney carried the date of May 16 and claimed that respondents would suffer damage "unless water is delivered to
the property of my clients during this week, * * *. '' Of
course, May 23rd is within one week of May 16th
(R. 425).
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As a final observation, it is interesting to note respondents' income tax returns as a general reflection on
the credibility of their testimony. Their income tax returns show that they operated less land in 1955 than they
did in 1954 (because the land rented in 1954 wasn't rented in 1955). Yet, their gross and net income was higher
in 1955 than it was in 1954. Their tax returns further
show that their operating expenses were not substantially
increased. This is of particular interest in light of the
huge sums which were allegedly spent in pumping water.
Certainly respondents' income tax returns do not corroborate their claims to much greater operating costs and
enormous crop damage in 1955. Their explanation of
variation in crop prices (R. 248-50) is hardly adequate.
It is believed that the items discussed under Point
4 clearly demonstrate that the damages awarded by the
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trial court were excessive, duplicitous, unwarranted, and
computed by using an erroneous measure.
PoiNT No. 5
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST ALL OF THE APPELLANTS.

The trial court rendered judgment against two corporations and four individuals. This is incredible in
light of the fact that evidence adduced at the trial wholly
failed to implicate any of the appellants except Arcon
Corporation. The evidence showed that defendant Arcon
Corporation was incorporated before any of the activity
of which respondents complain was actually commenced.
Arcon Corporation owned the property whereon the
ponds were situated and performed the work which respondents contend interfere with their water. Before the
judgment of the trial court can stand, it must be shown
that all six of the named appellants were liable to the respondents. Since the judgment has been entered against
all of the six appellants it must be shown that there
was evidence before the trial court to justify such
action. If the record contains any evidence of liability on behalf of all of the appellants, it is assumed that respondents will point to this evidence
in their brief. If not, five of these appellants have
been erroneously held liable to respondents. If this
Court feels that the trial court's judgment and decree can
be justified under any possible theory, then it is respectfully submitted that such judgment can only be sustained
against Arcon Corporation, who owned the land and per49
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formed the acts reasonably necesesary to subdivide it for
residential purposes. The other appellants are entitled
to a reversal and to their costs. Even if Arcon pays the
judgment they have a continuing obligation to pump
water, install pumps, etc., and have had to bring this
appeal to be relieved of this burden.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that as against all of the
appellants except Arcon Corporation, there is no evidence
of any kind to sustain a judgment on any theory. As to
all of these appellants, the case must be reversed and they
should be awarded their costs. As to the remaining appellant, we submit that the judgment should be totally reversed, both because we had a right a make a reasonable
use of (drain) our own land and respondents failed to
prove any vested interest entitling them to require us to
maintain ponds. If the court is unable to hold with us on
these points, then we submit that the matter should be reversed to have the quantity of water and the other elements of the water right fixed with definiteness and certainty, that we should not, in any event, be compelled to
pump water for lands which can be irrigated by gravity,
and that the measure of damages assessed by the trial
court is in error and should be reYersed.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
HAROLD R. BOYER
Attorneys for Appellants
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